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Global governance of training standards in an outsourced labour force: the training double-bind in 
seafarer license and certification assessments 
 
Michael Bloor1, Helen Sampson1, Victor Gekara2. 
1. Seafarers International Research Centre, Cardiff University,  




The shipping industry is amongst the most globalised of all industries and is characterised by 
complex modular supply chains, including a largely outsourced labour force of just-in-time, 
casualized workers from developing countries and the transitional East European States. Despite 
long-standing efforts by international bodies to standardise and regulate the education and training 
of seafarers, variations in practices and standards persist. Employers exercise contradictory 
influences on education and training providers, on the one hand demanding the provision of more 
recruits urgently (encouraging corner-cutting ) and on the other hand complaining about the poor 
quality of recruits received (urging crack-downs on poor quality providers and more rigorous 
examinations) – the training double bind.  This paper reflects on these issues through the study of 
the problematic use of computerised assessments in seafarer examinations, drawing upon findings 
from a study involving research in six different case study countries providing maritime labour and 
interviews with stakeholders. 
Key words: assessment; education and training; global governance; outsourcing; seafarers. 
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Introduction 
The shippiŶg iŶdustƌǇ is oŶe of the ŵotoƌs of gloďalisatioŶ, ǁith ŵoƌe thaŶ 9Ϭ% of the ǁoƌld͛s tƌade 
by volume being transported by sea, and with cheap maritime freight rates allowing imported goods 
to compete successfully with home-produced equivalents. But the shipping industry, with its mobile 
plant, is perhaps also the traditional industry that has been transformed more than any other by 
globalising economic processes (Sampson 2013).  The industry is increasingly structured in terms of 
͚gloďal ǀalue ĐhaiŶs͛ ;Geƌeffi et al. ϮϬϬϱͿ Đoŵposed of ŵultiple liŶked eŶteƌpƌises sĐatteƌed aĐƌoss 
the globe. Increasingly, ships are owned by transnational corporations and operated by international 
ship management companies who contract in turn with specialist international companies to supply 
a range of ship services, including (outsourced) crewing. Effectively, there is now a single global 
labour market for seafarers, the great majority of whom come from the developing countries and 
the transitional states of Eastern Europe: nine nations (the Philippines, Russia, the Ukraine, China, 
India, Poland, Indonesia, Turkey and Myanmar) together supply two thirds of the million seafarers in 
the international fleet (Sampson 2004). While it has long been a practice among ship operators to 
draw at least some of their ratings from developing countries, witness the traditional practice of UK 
ship operators of employing so-Đalled ͚lasĐaƌs͛ ;IŶdiaŶͿ ĐƌeǁŵeŶ, todaǇ ďoth offiĐeƌs aŶd ratings are 
likely to be drawn from the new labour supply countries. Seafarers are frequently employed, not by 
ship owners or operators, but by specialist international crewing agencies that contract to supply 
͚just-in-tiŵe͛, Đasualized labour with the requisite paper qualifications. Ship operators who once paid 
for labour force training through cadetships and apprenticeships have now, in effect, transferred the 
Đosts of tƌaiŶiŶg theiƌ outsouƌĐed laďouƌ to seafaƌeƌs theŵselǀes aŶd seafaƌeƌs͛ faŵilies iŶ the 
developing world. This paper seeks to investigate the impact of outsourcing the labour supply on 
one aspect of the quality of seafarer training, namely the problematic reliance on computerised 
multiple choice questions in the licensing examinations for would-be deck and engineering officers.  
Regulations on international training standards for officers are laid down by the UN agency, the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO), through its Standards of Training Certification and 
Watchkeeping (STCW). Apace with the growth of employment of officers from the new labour 
supply countries, concerns have grown about the seeming failure of some maritime education and 
training institutions (METs) training those officers. These concerns led IMO to set up the ͚ǁhite list͛ 
system in 2003: Member States were required to audit the quality of training in their local METs and 
to submit documentary evidence to IMO of the audit process; only seafarers trained in METS in 
those Meŵďeƌ “tates oŶ the ͚ǁhite list͛, deeŵed Đoŵpliant by IMO, would have their certificates of 
competency recognised for work in the international fleet. It was expected that the introduction of 
the IMO ͚ǁhite list͛ aŶd the aĐĐoŵpaŶǇiŶg ŶatioŶal audit sǇsteŵs ǁould ƌesult iŶ the Đlosuƌe of pooƌ 
METs and improvements in training standards. Some METs did indeed close but there is little 
evidence that the overall quality of the training undertaken by new recruits to the industry had 
improved following the introduction of the white list (Sampson 2004) and attention has increasingly 
focused on the effectiveness of the various national training audit systems, an important part of 
which is the oversight of seafarer examinations. In a range of seafarer supply countries, the very 
large numbers of examinees, limited examiner resources and past examiner corruption scandals 
have led national maritime administrations to make increasing use, or to consider making increasing 
use, of multiple choice computer-based assessments, despite the problems associated with such 
assessment formats, including their inappropriateness for testing higher order cognitive skills.  
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We have reviewed elsewhere the large literature on computer-based assessments and have also 
considered employer reactions to multiple choice testing and the general standards underpinning 
officer licenses (Sampson et al. 2011; Gekara et al. 2011).  In seeking to examine how outsourcing of 
seafarer labour to specialist crewing agencies operating in new labour supply countries has 
problematised the assessment of seafarer training, and to examine how effectively international 
regulations on training standards are enforced, this paper lies at the intersection of two research 
literatures: firstly, the literature on outsourcing; and secondly, the literature on effective 
governance.  
There is, of course, a large literature on the results of the outsourcing out of public services. Studies 
of the contracting out of public services in developing countries and transitional states are 
particularly instructive. Many contracted-out services performed poorly because of poor 
government contract management (Mills 1998; Larbi 1998; Lember 2004). Where contracting-out 
schemes have provision for well-resourced and intensive contract monitoring, they have been more 
successful (Marek et al. 1999; Palmer et al. 2006): effective oversight has been crucial. On the 
outsourcing of labour, employment agencies are increasingly displacing unions in the regulation of 
the employment relations (MacKenzie & Lucio 2005). McDowell et al. (2008) have overviewed  
sociological studies on employment agencies: none of these have considered the case of crewing 
agencies, but the impression from the literature on segmented, outsourced, labour markets 
corresponds to the position in the shipping industry: at one extreme, there are employment 
agencies providing a ͚ďuffeƌ stoĐk͛ ;Booth et al. ϮϬϬϮͿ of ͚ǁaƌŵ ďodies͛ ;Paƌkeƌ ϭ99ϰͿ; at the otheƌ 
extreme, other agencies specialise in supplying well-qualified staff to meet industry shortages, 
temporary and otherwise.  
Studies of the impact of outsourcing of labour on training are less common, but the work of Forde 
and MacKenzie on outsourcing and training in the UK construction and telecommunications 
iŶdustƌies has ďeeŶ paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ ŶoteǁoƌthǇ. MaĐKeŶzie͛s ;ϮϬϬϬͿ studǇ of labour force training at BT 
plĐ folloǁed the outsouƌĐiŶg of the teleĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s Điǀil eŶgiŶeeƌiŶg aŶd ĐaďliŶg 
work to contractors. The contractor firms subsequently struggled to deliver on contracts because of 
shortages of skilled labour. Accordingly, BT encouraged contractor firms to set up their own training 
schemes and BT accredited those it approved: BT thus found itself obliged to regulate training within 
a laďouƌ ŵaƌket fƌoŵ ǁhiĐh it had ǁithdƌaǁŶ. Foƌde aŶd MaĐKeŶzie͛s ;ϮϬϬϰͿ papeƌ oŶ tƌaining in 
the construction industry suggests that an over-dependence on contingent labour (sub-contractors 
and self-employed workers) is associated with low levels of apprenticeships and skill shortages. And 
a further study of the construction industry by Forde et al. (2008) reported that construction firms 
were unwilling to further extend their existing reliance on agency labour because of perceived 
problems with the quality of that outsourced labour. Detailed studies of the impact of offshore 
outsourcing on overseas training standards, parallel to this study, have not been located, but 
concerns have been raised about the quality of overseas training  in a number of industry sectors 
where outsourcing is occurring (for example, in the computer software industry – Asprey et al. 
2006), and some states have legislated to require qualified immigrants to sit additional examinations 
to ensure that they meet the required national standards (for example, the US requirements on 
immigrant nursing staff – Fulbright Commission 2004). In contextualising this paper we take 
globalisation to signify a process, rather than an event or outcome or a mere intensification of trade 
(Hirst and Thompson, 1999), and we take this process to entail the evolution of new economic 
structures. Since one of the drivers of globalisation is the flow of capital across national boundaries 
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to avoid regulatory costs, and since some of those evolving new economic structures are designed 
partly to facilitate regulatory avoidance, it is a given of much writing on globalisation (e.g. Dicken 
2001) that effective governance of globalised industries is highly problematic. Indeed, the shipping 
industry can be taken as an exemplar of the problems of governance of globalised industries. Thus, 
all vessels must ďe ƌegisteƌed ǁith a ŶatioŶal ship ƌegistƌǇ aŶd aƌe suďjeĐt to that ŶatioŶ͛s shippiŶg 
regulations wherever the vessel trades, a juƌisdiĐtioŶ kŶoǁŶ as ͚Flag “tate CoŶtƌol͛; the various flag-
States are represented at the International Maritime Organisation and translate into their national 
shipping regulations those IMO conventions to which they are signatories. The ship registry currently 
with the largest tonnage is that of Panama, originally set up by American shipping interests after the 
First World War to avoid what they viewed as onerous US laws regulating crewing standards. This 
fiƌst ǀeŶtuƌe iŶ ĐƌeatiŶg aŶ ͚off-shoƌe͛ ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ƌegistƌǇ ;aka ͚opeŶ ƌegistƌǇ͛ oƌ ͚flag of 
ĐoŶǀeŶieŶĐe͛Ϳ ǁas gƌaduallǇ folloǁed ďǇ otheƌs, gathering pace from the 1980s, until today there is 
even a Mongolian Registry, despite the fact that Mongolia lies 850 miles from the sea. The 
commercial registries market is a segmented one, with some registries seeking to provide an 
efficient and effective service to ship operators who, in turn, seek to market themselves to 
Đhaƌteƌeƌs as ͚ƋualitǇ͛ Đaƌƌieƌs. But ŵaŶǇ otheƌ ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ƌegistƌies siŵplǇ offeƌ Đheap ƌegistƌatioŶ 
to operators seeking to save money by regulatory avoidance, for example by registering their vessels 
with commercial registries which allow vessels to operate with smaller crewing levels (as specified 
uŶdeƌ the ƌegistƌǇ͛s ͚“afe MaŶŶiŶg͛ ƌegulatioŶsͿ thaŶ the ĐƌeǁiŶg leǀels alloǁed ďǇ Đoŵpetitoƌ 
registries (Bloor ϮϬϭϯͿ. This is the ͚ƌush to the ďottoŵ͛ phenomenon (in both labour standards and 
environment standards) which many commentators on globalisation have commented upon (e.g. 
Lasselle et al. 2004).  
The shipping industry can also be taken as an exemplar of the evolution of structures to address the 
problems of globalisatioŶ. The iŶdustƌǇ has a ͚polǇĐeŶtƌiĐ͛ goǀeƌŶaŶĐe structure (Black, 2008), 
fragmentary, complex, multi-level and overlapping in character. There are regional regulators, such 
as the European Union, as well as international regulators. There are local regulators, such as port 
health authorities, as well as national regulators. Port State Control, the enforcement of 
international regulations on all berthing ships iŶ a ŶatioŶ͛s poƌt ƌegaƌdless of flag, has eǀolǀed to tƌǇ 
and address the deficiencies of Flag State Control (Bloor et al. 2006). Private transnational 
governance (Bartley, 2007) has also emerged: most importantly, the oil majors have set up their own 
Ship Inspection Report Programme (SIRE) to vet the seaworthiness of vessels in the tanker trade 
(Bloor et al. 2013) in an attempt to avoid the reputational damage caused by major marine oil 
pollution incidents.    
“hippiŶg iŶdustƌǇ goǀeƌŶaŶĐe has also atteŵpted to ŵoǀe ďeǇoŶd ͚ĐoŵŵaŶd aŶd ĐoŶtƌol͛ 
approaches. Some writers such as Braithwaite and colleagues (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992; 
Braithwaite 2005; Braithwaite & Drahos 2000) and Gunningham et al. (1998) have pointed to 
͚ƌespoŶsiǀe ƌegulatioŶ͛ oƌ ͚sŵaƌt ƌegulatioŶ͛ stƌategies foƌ gloďalised seĐtoƌs ǁhiĐh iŶĐeŶtiǀise 
regulatees towards pro-active compliaŶĐe aŶd flip ͚ŵaƌkets iŶ ǀiĐe͛ iŶto ͚ŵaƌkets iŶ ǀiƌtue͛ 
(Braithwaite 2005). But other writers (Haines 2003; Nelkin 2002) have argued that international 
regulations can never be invariantly applied, enforcement being modified and vitiated by differences 
iŶ ͚loĐal ƌegulatoƌǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛ ;HaiŶes ϮϬϬϯͿ, aƌisiŶg fƌoŵ diffeƌeŶt ŶatioŶal eĐoŶoŵiĐ, politiĐal aŶd 
cultural contexts. The afore-mentioned IMO white-list requires national maritime administrations to 
supply documentary evidence that they have audited training standards in their local METs, an 
example of what Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) and Hutter, in her study of UK railway regulation, 
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(Hutter 2001) have teƌŵed ͚eŶfoƌĐed self-ƌegulatioŶ͛. EŶfoƌĐed self-regulation (according to Hutter, 
never particularly effective in the case of the railways) is particularly susceptible to erosion by 
difficult economic circumstances, political pressure and local cultural practice, as we have sought to 
demonstrate previously (Sampson 2004; Sampson and Bloor 2007) with the shipping industry as an 
example. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) envisaged enforced self-regulation as being effective only if 
backed up, in an enforcement pyramid, by the prospect of punishment for the non-compliant, by 
ǁhat theǇ Đalled a ͚ďeŶigŶ ďig guŶ͛. Big gun punishment for non-compliant States in the case of 
seafarer training, would comprise deletion of those States from the IMO ͚ǁhite list͛ aŶd the 
consequent non-recognition of seafarer qualifications by port-States (backed up by port-State 
inspections of seafarer certificates on berthing ships). However, deletion from the white list is only a 
practical punishment option for States that are small-scale suppliers of maritime labour: non-
recognition of the seafarer certification provided by major suppliers of seafarer labour would cause 
large-scale labour shortages and massive disruption of world trade. Thus, paper compliance (the 
supply of documentary evidence of local audits, without international inspection) has been until very 
recently the only requirement faĐiŶg the ŵajoƌ laďouƌ supplǇ ĐouŶtƌies. The ƋualifiĐatioŶ ͚uŶtil ǀeƌǇ 
ƌeĐeŶtlǇ͛ is ŶeĐessaƌǇ heƌe, ďeĐause a ƌegioŶal ďodǇ unconnected with IMO, the European Maritime 
Safety Agency, conducted an on-the-spot inspection of education and training institutions in the 
PhilippiŶes ;the ǁoƌld͛s laƌgest supplieƌ of seafaƌeƌsͿ iŶ ϮϬϭϬ. FolloǁiŶg that inspection report, the 
Filipino government has shut down three maritime academies and re-organised the government 
agency which oversees maritime training (Leander & Osler 2012). However, it remains a possibility 
that, following further reports from EMSA inspectors, the Philippines will fail to satisfy the 
requirements of the European Commission with serious consequences for the employment of 
Filipino seafarers on EU-flagged vessels. 
HaiŶes ;ϮϬϭϭͿ has sought to applǇ AƌĐheƌ͛s ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ǁoƌk oŶ huŵaŶ ageŶĐǇ to the field of goǀeƌŶaŶĐe. 
“he sees ͚optiŵal ǀigilaŶĐe [...] defiŶed as the leǀel of atteŶtioŶ to ƌisk appƌopƌiate iŶ a paƌtiĐulaƌ 
ĐoŶteǆt͛ ;HaiŶes ϮϬϭϭ, p. 121) as arising out of the complex local relationships between agency and 
structural elements. Various structural elements are identified which impact on agency to 
undermine vigilance. Thus regulatory autonomy is shaped by the structural elements of capacity and 
expertise – the resources provided to regulators and the skills they possess. Another important 
structural element is political support, that is, the level of protection provided to regulators by 
governments in response to commercial pressures to weaken the regulatory regime. Haines applies 
this agency/structure analysis to two examples of Australian governance systems, but it seems clear 
that the same conceptual tools could be used to facilitate cross-national comparative studies of 
governance systems.  
Drawing on these various literatures, this paper explores some of the challenges facing those who 
are engaged in the attempt to standardise vocational qualifications and skills across globalised 
labour markets. Following on from the section on the study methods, the paper describes in turn, 
fiƌstlǇ, the ĐƌeǁiŶg ageŶĐies͛ aĐtiǀities iŶ supplǇiŶg just-in-time, casualized labour with the requisite 
certifications, and then the practices in the different study countries in examining those sitting for 
offiĐeƌs͛ certificates/licenses. We note in particular the limited resource available for such 
assessŵeŶts iŶ the Ŷeǁ laďouƌ supplǇ ĐouŶtƌies. The papeƌ goes oŶ to desĐƌiďe ship opeƌatoƌs͛ laĐk 
of trust in the effectiveness of those examinations and concerns about the development of 
computerised assessments. The next section shows these concerns to be largely borne out by 
various deficiencies that we identify in current computerised assessment systems. We then point to 
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a training double-bind whereby institutions and countries on the supply-side of the seafarer labour 
market feel pressure both to introduce more rigorous assessment to improve training quality and 
pressure to relax training standards to increase the supply of seafarers. We conclude that ship 
operators, in outsourcing their labour, have lost control of the quality of the labour force and 
͚eŶfoƌĐed self-ƌegulatioŶ͛ has Ŷot suĐĐeeded iŶ eŶfoƌĐiŶg iŶteƌŶatioŶal tƌaiŶiŶg staŶdaƌds aŶd 
rigorous assessments; segmented labour markets have emerged and global governance has been 
uŶdeƌŵiŶed ďǇ ͚loĐal ƌegulatoƌǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛.   
 
Methods 
The research upon which this paper primarily draws was commissioned and funded by the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA). It involved case studies in six major seafarer labour supply countries 
(three traditional European maritime countries and three of the major new labour supply countries) 
serving European flagged ships and interviews with selected industry stakeholders, regulators and 
employers. Each case-study entailed visits by two researchers to each country and the conduct of 
observational visits to maritime education and training institutions (METs) , national and regional 
examination centres, and national regulatory bodies. To ensure some consistency with regard to the 
establishment of an overview of all the case study countries, one researcher (Sampson) visited all six 
countries joining Bloor or Gekara respectively. IŶ additioŶ use ǁas ŵade of aŶ ͚oďseƌǀatioŶ guide͛ iŶ 
visiting MET institutions. 
In visiting maritime education and training institutions researchers examined curricula and 
examination materials, maintained detailed fieldnotes, and undertook informal interviews with key 
personnel. National Maritime Administrations and their regional offshoots (local maritime 
administrations) were visited and detailed interviews established the nature of the structure of the 
examination systems utilised in relation to seafarers and details of examination procedures and 
conduct. To give a flavour of these case study visits, one such visit lasted twelve days, entailed six 
visits to METs (both state-run and private, including one MET that had so far been unsuccessful in 
seeking accreditation) in both the capital and a provincial city, collection of specimen examination 
questions, brief observation of simulator-based training and collection of specimen simulator tests, 
formal and informal discussions with MET staff, three recorded formal interviews with regulators 
and a group meeting with the national board of examiners. The methods used in the six case studies 
were not uniform and depended on the size of the maritime education and training field in the 
countries visited. The methods ĐoƌƌespoŶded to the ͚ƌapid assessŵeŶt teĐhŶiƋues͛ ;Bloor 2006) 
developed particularly by researchers working for UN agencies such as the World Health 
Organization and the United Nations International Drug Control Program, where multiple methods 
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such as  observation and key informant interviews have been used to provide reliable information in 
a relatively  short time-scale (see, for example: Chambers 1981; Fitch et al. 2000; Rhodes et al. 
1999).  
In addition to interviews with regulators, seventeen formal recorded interviews (on average lasting 
60 minutes each) were also conducted with senior fleet personnel managers (or equivalent) to 
ascertain their views on the quality of recruits and on international training and assessment 
standards and procedures. Although the UK remains an important centre of the maritime industry, 
care was taken to interview foreign-based, as well as UK-based, fleet personnel managers, all of 
whom were recruited thƌough the eǆistiŶg dataďase of iŶdustƌǇ ĐoŶtaĐts ŵaiŶtaiŶed ďǇ Caƌdiff͛s 
Seafarers International Research Centre. The interviews were semi-structured in nature (a format 
which both allows the free exploration of emergent themes and which is more acceptable to senior 
and expert interviewees)  and the interviews were all digitally recorded and transcribed prior to 
analysis with the aid of NVivo software. Additionally a Delphi group (not reported on here) was 
convened in order to establish a degree of consensus about the core criteria in the conduct of 
rigorous assessment procedures in this industry sector. The national maritime administrations of the 
six case study countries took part in the study on the understanding that the countries concerned 
would not be named in any reports of the research and we have therefore taken care that neither 
direct nor deductive disclosure results from the publication of this paper. 
Where relevant, this article also makes secondary use of material collected in two further studies: an 
earlier EMSA-funded study of training capacities in selected new labour supply countries; and a 
British Academy-funded pilot study of seafarer training. The methodologies of both of these 
additional studies have been fully reported elsewhere (Bloor and Sampson 2009; Sampson 2004) 
and included observational fieldnotes on visits to METs, focus groups with seafarers and interviews 
with maritime administration officials and industry stakeholders.   
The Demand for Just-In-Time Recruits 
Across modular supply chains efforts are made  to minimise costs by ensuring that required goods 
and services are delivered just-in-time and do not generate extensive associated  inventory-holding 
Đosts ;ǁaƌehousiŶg, ͚dead tiŵe͛, etĐͿ. The just-in-time principle is also applied to outsourced labour. 
In the main, contemporary ship operators do not permanently employ a pool of qualified labour 
from which they draw for the crewing of vessels: rather, they contract with specialist crewing 
agencies or ship management companies for the just-in-time supply of suitably qualified crew as, 
and when, they are required. Crewing agencies in turn access local casualized labour for 
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employment on short-teƌŵ ĐoŶtƌaĐts. It is the ĐƌeǁiŶg ageŶĐǇ͛s ƌespoŶsiďilitǇ to eŶsuƌe that the 
crew they supply are in possession of the requisite international qualifications. Such qualifications 
include internationally recognised seafarer licences (often termed Certificates of Competency) which 
are issued by national maritime administrations following the successful completion of approved 
examinations and additional ancillary qualifications which are obtained from nationally approved 
training centres after attendance at short courses.  
AssessŵeŶt of “eafaƌeƌs͛ CoŵpeteŶĐies 
As a consequence of this labour supply process, and the associated casualized nature of the seafarer 
labour force, throughout the sector there is a strong reliance on certification attesting to the training 
and qualifications of seafarers. Additionally, there have been strong and sustained efforts to 
standardise the competencies of seafarers accessing the international labour market. Under the 
umbrella of the international STCW regulations however, national maritime administrations remain 
primarily responsible for the oversight and conduct of seafarer examinations and have considerable 
autonomy with regard to all aspects of the assessment and licensing process. This inevitably 
produces variation in practice with the potential to produce variations in standards which require 
further exploration and scrutiny. Such variations in assessment practice are of particular potential 
significance given that it has already been established that there are major differences in the quality 
of education and training provided both within and across countries (Sampson 2004,  Sampson and 
Bloor 2007). 
Within the six case-study countries that we focussed on, we identified three general models being 
utilised in the assessment of seafarers. One was a devolved model where responsibility for 
assessment was placed entirely in the hands of universities and the acquisition of appropriate 
qualifications from recognised universities automatically entitled trainee seafarers to a licence to 
seƌǀe as a juŶioƌ offiĐeƌ oŶĐe theǇ had ͚ĐloĐked-up͛ the ƌeƋuisite aŵouŶt of sea-time as a cadet. The 
second model in contrast relied entirely upon centralised examinations conducted by, or on behalf 
of, national maritime administrations. Having passed such examinations, seafarers were issued with 
licences provided that they had accumulated sufficient sea-time serving as cadets on relevant types 
of vessels. In the third assessment model, that we identified, a combination of these approaches was 
in use i.e. some licences were issued on production of qualifications from a small number of 
approved higher education institutions and for the remainder of cadets (those who had attended 
other colleges) centralised examinations were conducted. In all cases evidence of requisite periods 
of pƌaĐtiĐal eǆpeƌieŶĐe aďoaƌd ǀessels as tƌaiŶee ͚Đadets͛ had also to be produced and endorsed. 
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For the purposes of this paper, more important than the variations between countries in terms of 
the conduct of authorised examinations, were the very considerable, associated, differences in the 
methods of assessment employed in relation to seafarer examinations. For example, within one 
Maritime Administration an oral examination conducted by a specially convened panel of suitably 
qualified examiners was the primary form of seafarer assessment, whilst in another a very different 
combination of computer-based examinations was utilised (relying upon a computer-based multiple 
choice examination and a separate simulator-based test). In general, we found that in each of the six 
different case study countries there were variations in assessment practices which encompassed: 
differences in where assessment occurred (i.e. at colleges or central state examinations 
centres/private state approved examination centres); differences in whom the examiners were (e.g. 
national maritime administration officials or college lecturers); differences in whether or not 
assessments were undertaken by single individuals or by panels of experts; differences in whether or 
not candidates were personally known to, and taught by, assessors; and differences in the form of 
assessment (oral examination, written essay based examination, paper and/or computer-based 
multiple choice tests, individual simulator tests, group simulator tests, short answer papers and/or 
any combinations of these). Further, it was possible to identify some similarities between new 
labour supply countries and their approach to assessment, which was less labour-intensive and more 
reliant upon new technologies than the approaches taken in the three traditional European 
maritime labour supply countries which we studied.  
The new labour supply countries, processing thousands of seafarer licence applications each year, 
faced major problems relating to human resource, as explained by one maritime administration 
official: 
͚Theƌe aƌe oŶlǇ [a very small number of] board members doing examinations, and every year 
there would be about 10,000 examinees, how good an examination can it be without the 
computerised examinatioŶ sǇsteŵ? […] the sheeƌ Ŷuŵďeƌs of eǆaŵiŶees ĐaŶŶot ďe [haŶdled] 
by so few examiners. Even if they doubled or even they make it tenfold, which the government 
ǁill Ŷot do ďeĐause of the ďudget͛ ;ŵaƌitiŵe adŵiŶistƌatioŶ offiĐialͿ (Country B). 
There was, as a result, strong pressure to consider methods of speeding up the examination process 
whilst utilising only the existing human resource (i.e. lecturers, examiners etc). This produced a great 
interest in the conduct of computer based forms of assessment using automated marking and 
relying heavily upon multiple choice questions. Computerised assessment was also attractive to 
those national maritime administrations whose examination systems had previously been subject to 
corruption scandals, as a way of limiting human involvement and enhancing transparency: 
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͚I͛ll haǀe to ďe fƌaŶk […] if Ǉou aƌe the eǆaŵiŶee, aŶd I ĐoŶduĐt the eǆaŵiŶatioŶ, I haǀe the 
ĐapaďilitǇ to deteƌŵiŶe ǁhetheƌ Ǉou should pass oƌ Ŷot iƌƌespeĐtiǀe… “o, iŶ ŵost Đases, Ǉou 
want to pass, I pass Ǉou foƌ a fee. That is ǁhat happeŶs heƌe͛ ;ŵaƌitiŵe adŵiŶistƌatioŶ offiĐialͿ 
(Country B). 
Pressure to increase supply in order to meet a growing international demand for officers and satisfy 
the requirement for just-in-time recruitment seems to form a major part of the drive for new and 
supposedly more efficient computer-based assessment technologies. 
“hip Opeƌatoƌs͛ ‘eaĐtioŶs 
Whilst employers were broadly unaware of the detailed ways in which licence issue occurs in 
different maritime labour supply countries, the development of computerised assessments for 
seafarers had created considerable unease amongst industry stakeholders. Most ship operators 
recruit labour via a range of crewing agencies based locally in a variety of labour supply countries 
and even those who retained direct contact in the recruitment process of certain officer positions 
(usually the most senior positions on board such as Captain and Chief Engineer) placed a strong 
reliance on seafarer licences in attesting to standards of competence, skills, and knowledge across 
the labour force. These employers were frequently unhappy about the inherent limitations 
associated with multiple choice examinations in relation to the assessment of many skills which they 
regarded as essential in the management of their vessels and there were persistent concerns 
relating to issues of seafarer competence more generally.  
In some cases variations in examination practices undermined confidence in the establishment of 
basic minimum standards underpinning the issue of internationally recognised licences in 
accordance with the STCW regulations. In these circumstances a two-tier labour market has 
emerged as employers differentiate not only between countries in terms of recruitment practices 
but also between training and education establishments within countries. In this latter case ship 
operators were choosing to disregard national certificates and rely instead upon local knowledge 
and past experience in deciding on the provenance of seafarer supply.  
͚IŶ [CouŶtƌǇ X] ǁe aƌe Ƌuite seleĐtiǀe. I͛ŵ Ŷot suƌe of the [METs] ǁe haǀe ďlaĐklisted ďut theƌe 
is a list ǁe doŶ͛t touĐh. GeŶeƌallǇ ǁe use the [MET Y] ďeĐause ǁe haǀe had ǀeƌǇ good ƌesults 
[…] [the otheƌs aƌe] a ǁaste of tiŵe͛ ;EŵploǇeƌͿ 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, suĐh atteŵpts to ͚piĐk ǁiŶŶeƌs͛ aŵoŶg the METs, ƌegaƌdless of the fƌailties aŶd 
suďjeĐtiǀeŶess of the ͚piĐkiŶg ǁiŶŶeƌs͛ appƌoaĐh, disƌegaƌd the siŶgle ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt iŶdiĐatoƌ of 
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relevant knowledge and competencies, namely seafarers licenses. Thus a reliance entirely on 
computer-based assessment methodologies in license examinations, particularly utilising multiple 
ĐhoiĐe ƋuestioŶs, ǁould fuƌtheƌ uŶdeƌŵiŶe opeƌatoƌs͛ ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ seafaƌeƌ liĐeŶses. A gƌeat 
dilemma for operators is that such methodologies are becoming popular in the new labour supply 
countries which provide the largest numbers of seafarers to the international fleet. 
Variations in Assessment and Inspections  
EŵploǇeƌs͛ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout the ƋualitǇ of assessŵeŶts of seafaƌeƌ tƌaiŶiŶg ǁeƌe laƌgelǇ ďoƌŶe out ďǇ 
our case study data. Thus, where multiple choice questions were used for license assessments, we 
found instances where the appropriate question bank (from which questions were randomly 
generated) was very small and in another instance past questions (still within the question bank) 
were in the public domain for legal reasons. Such circumstances encourage candidates to prepare 
foƌ eǆaŵiŶatioŶs ďǇ ƌote leaƌŶiŶg aŶd eŶĐouƌage iŶstƌuĐtoƌs to ͚teaĐh to the test͛. We also fouŶd 
examples of questions which were inappropriate in the sense that they did not test the knowledge 
ƌeƋuiƌed ďǇ iŶteƌŶatioŶal ƌegulatioŶs ;aŶd of Đouƌse ƌeƋuiƌed ďǇ eŵploǇeƌsͿ. Foƌ eǆaŵple: ͚Who fiƌst 
disĐoǀeƌed the ǁoƌld ǁas ƌouŶd? AͿ BͿ CͿ͛. 
Relatedly, it is very difficult to design multiple choice questions which test higher order cognitive 
skills. We collected specimen multiple choice questions from the case study countries and graded 
theŵ aĐĐoƌdiŶg to Blooŵ͛s ǁell-known taxonomy of different types of cognitive skills – ͚leǀel ϲ: 
eǀaluatioŶ͛, ͚leǀel ϱ: sǇŶthesis͛, ͚leǀel ϰ: aŶalǇsis͛, ͚leǀel ϯ: appliĐatioŶ͛, ͚leǀel Ϯ: ĐoŵpƌeheŶsioŶ͛, aŶd 
͚leǀel ϭ: kŶoǁledge͛ ;Blooŵ, ϭ9ϱϲͿ. We fouŶd ϳϭ% of all the speĐiŵeŶ ƋuestioŶs oŶlǇ tested the 
ďottoŵ tǁo leǀels of Blooŵ͛s ĐogŶitiǀe taǆoŶoŵǇ, kŶoǁledge aŶd Đoŵpƌehension, none of the 
speĐiŵeŶ ƋuestioŶs tested the top tǁo leǀels of Blooŵ͛s taǆoŶoŵǇ, eǀaluatioŶ aŶd sǇŶthesis, aŶd 
only 14% (all from just one country) tested the analysis skills of candidates. The higher cognitive 
skills required by officers, such as report-writing, were not being assessed. 
Bridge and engine simulators can be used to assess seafarer competencies which cannot be readily 
assessed by multiple choice questions and simulators are indeed currently used for assessment 
purposes by some maritime administrations (although only by one of those in our six case studies) 
and there is an expectation that they may be more widely used in future. Industry stakeholders were 
also generally supportive of the use of simulators to assess competencies. However, we found a 
number of problems with their current use.  
One difficulty associated with simulator assessments is that of the tension between two different 
assessment criteria, that of validity (i.e. appropriateness for purpose) and that of reliability (i.e. 
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consistency of testing across a range of instruments, across assessors and across time). In the single 
administration where simulator assessment was directly utilised for license examinations, reliability 
of the assessment was assured by the automatic marking of simulator exercises by the simulator 
assessment software itself. Candidates were assessed individually, criteria were clear, and passes 
and fails were objectively established. However, the simulator scenarios themselves were rather 
artificial and rudimentary: plotting a course from A to B and dealing with oncoming and crossing 
traffic in the bridge scenarios; and identifying and solving two operating problems in the engine 
scenarios. The incorporation of more complex (and more valid) scenarios that, for example, involved 
understanding the engine as a set of integrated systems, or dealing with bridge emergencies that 
involved communication and team-working skills, would necessarily result in a loss of assessment 
reliability due to the need for human assessors, moderation of marks, candidates being assessed in 
groups (to represent a bridge team), rotation of assessment tasks within the group, consistency of 
rotated tasks, and so on. 
A second difficulty associated with simulator assessment is that of security. In the same 
administration as that above, where simulator assessment was used for license examinations, the 
administration lacked the resources to establish its own dedicated simulator centres for assessment 
purposes, and to employ its own invigilators. Instead, assessments were conducted on simulators 
located in METs and invigilated by MET staff. Although the examination scenarios were kept locked 
away at the METs and the scenario chosen for a given examination was selected by a member of the 
administration staff, the bank of scenarios from which the selection was made was small (containing 
as few as seven scenarios for some examinations). Most of the METs were commercial operations 
tƌadiŶg oŶ theiƌ ƌeputatioŶs foƌ ͚ĐƌaŵŵiŶg͛ ĐaŶdidates thƌough suĐh eǆaŵiŶatioŶs, folloǁiŶg fouƌ 
days of specifically tailored simulator training. The MET staff of course had detailed knowledge of 
the various scenarios contained in the question bank. InstƌuĐtoƌs theƌefoƌe ͚taught to the test͛ aŶd 
the validity of the test as an assessment of broad competency was consequently low. Moreover, in a 
license assessment we were able to observe, security was less than perfect: it would have been 
possible for candidates who had just taken the assessment to pass on advance knowledge of the 
scenario to those candidates waiting their turn on the simulator. And, although CCTV footage was 
available to national administration officials to check that invigilation procedures had been complied 
with, a manpower shortage meant that such CCTV checks were only conducted if a complaint was 
lodged. 
Whilst problems with validity were most strongly prevalent in relation to the application of new 
technologies to assessment process, it is important to note that it is not only here that problems 
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were identified. Traditional maritime labour supply countries tended to have robust assessment 
systems utilising a mixture of methods and producing a high degree of validity in the assessment 
process. However in some of these states there were problems relating to the reliability of 
examination systems and their capacity to produce consistency in standards. For example, in one 
labour supply country where approved universities were responsible for the assessment which 
would directly lead to the issue of a licence (without further examination) lecturers expressed 
concern that there were inconsistent standards applied across the institutions concerned. These 
colleges were in competition with each other for students and had an interest in the maintenance of 
high pass rates. Whilst an adequate range of assessment practices were in use, in a process where 
no internal or external moderation of examinations or assessments occurred, and where 
assessments took a variety of forms, variations in standards were able to flourish and could be seen 
as legitimate cause for concern. In a second traditional European maritime labour supply country, a 
similar system pertained with regard to a small number of maritime universities whose degrees 
automatically qualified seafarers (with the correct amount of sea-time) for licenses. Whilst in this 
country some central examinations were conducted for students, who attended other institutions, 
amongst those whose degrees conferred the award of a licence there was once again no system for 
internal or external assessment moderation.  The most consistent practice was found in a European 
state where examinations were conducted by specially convened panels of experts who were 
required to aƌƌiǀe at a ĐoŶseŶsus ǁith ƌegaƌd to a ĐaŶdidate͛s peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe aŶd deĐide upoŶ 
whether the candidate had attained a pass or a fail. 
The Examination and Training Double-Bind 
 Just as ship operators are aware of the deficiencies of multiple choice format assessments, they are 
also aware of the uneven quality of the seafarer education and training underpinning apparently 
standardised and internationally recognised qualifications. As a result, some operators will only 
accept crew that have been trained in certain countries or will recruit from a country they have 
concerns about but differentiate between cadets from colleges that they believe offer quality 
training and those from colleges which they feel are substandard; distrustful of licenses as evidence 
of competency, theǇ atteŵpt to ͚piĐk ǁiŶŶeƌs͛ oŶ the ďasis of tƌaiŶiŶg histoƌǇ: 
͚A good liďƌaƌǇ [is iŵpoƌtaŶt] aŶd Ŷeǆt is eƋuipŵeŶt. Of Đouƌse [College )] aƌe alƌight. AŶotheƌ 
ŵaƌitiŵe sĐhool, alŵost all oǀeƌ… ǀeƌǇ pooƌ… ǀeƌǇ pooƌ eƋuipŵeŶt aŶd ǀeƌǇ pooƌ, sometimes, 
iŶstƌuĐtoƌs also͛ ;EŵploǇeƌͿ. 
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Operators are likewise aware of the need to improve training standards through robust government 
accreditation schemes. As afore-mentioned, the International Maritime Organisation has introduced 
a requirement for national maritime administrations to supply documentation to IMO on the 
inspection and accreditation of METs, but this ͚eŶfoƌĐed self-ƌegulatioŶ͛ is an approach more often 
associated with paper compliance than substantive compliance. Those countries supplying 
satisfactory documentation will have their training programmes internationally recognised on the 
IMO ͚ǁhite list͛. “oŵe ship opeƌatoƌs haǀe ďeeŶ ǀeƌǇ ĐƌitiĐal of the laƌge Ŷuŵďeƌs of METs that soŵe 
national administrations in the new labour supply countries have accredited, with implied criticism 
of those adŵiŶistƌatioŶs͛ iŶspeĐtioŶ aŶd aĐĐƌeditatioŶ sǇsteŵs ;see Sampson 2004, for a detailed 
report).  
Some operators conduct their own additional shore training to remedy perceived deficiencies in 
educational standards, or trial shipboard assessments of would-be recruits, weeding out those 
whom they deem inadequate despite possession of the requisite paper qualifications. This mistrust 
of international qualifications does not simply apply at entry (officer cadet) level but also pertains in 
relation to the licences required by the most senior officers. For example, one operator we spoke to 
went to the considerable effort and cost of sending newly recruited masters to sea for a trial period 
(working alongside experienced masters) in order to allow for a thorough assessment of their skills 
and competence. However, the multiplicity of largely autonomous sources in the complex global 
seafarer labour supply chain makes quality control a difficult task for a shipping industry which is 
also not always united on the quality agenda in labour sourcing. 
As a result of the costs and risks they incur in association with the shortcomings of current licensing 
systems, some ship operators (concerned about damage to expensive equipment and concerned 
about ship safety) have urged maritime administrations and international regulators to make 
improvements to the national and international enforcement of maritime education and training 
standards. This leads to the puzzling question of ǁhǇ it is that those oŶ the ͚deŵaŶd͛ side iŶ the 
seafarer labour market have not been more successful in raising the quality of the labour being 
supplied: in free market situations, if those with the buying power demand better quality, then they 
can generally be expected to get their own way. In part, the answer to the puzzle is that ship 
operators are making demands, not only on the quality of seafarer labour, but also on the quantity. 
Indeed, industry analysts and the shipping press have long been reporting staff shortages in certain 
grades (especially senior officers) and in certain trades (eg. gas carriers) – see for example, 
BIMCO/ISF 2005; Lloyds List 2008. The retreat of most ship operators from training their own 
national recruits and the shift, discussed earlier, to just-in-time recruitment, puts pressure on 
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crewing agencies (and thus on training providers) to sacrifice quality for immediacy of delivery. In 
otheƌ ǁoƌds, those iŶstitutioŶs aŶd ĐouŶtƌies oŶ the ͚supplǇ͛ side of the seafaƌeƌ laďouƌ ŵaƌket are 
in a double-bind, feeling pressure on the one hand to improve training quality and introduce more 
rigorous assessment, and pressure on the other hand to relax training standards to increase the 
supply of seafarers. This pressure may be enhanced by the need for new labour supply countries to 
maximise revenues that can be accrued as a consequence of the export of labour and the return 
͚hoŵe͛ of ƌeŵittaŶĐes. IŶdeed a seŶioƌ offiĐial iŶ oŶe ŵaƌitiŵe adŵiŶistƌatioŶ told us that soŵe 
Japanese ship operatoƌs ǁho ǁeƌe ŵajoƌ eŵploǇeƌs foƌ his ŶatioŶ͛s seafaƌeƌs had told hiŵ that his 
ŶatioŶ͛s seafaƌeƌ liĐeŶsiŶg assessŵeŶts ǁeƌe too ƌigoƌous aŶd that he aŶd his Đolleagues iŶ the 
ŵaƌitiŵe adŵiŶistƌatioŶ ǁeƌe, iŶ effeĐt, daŵagiŶg his ŶatioŶ͛s foƌeigŶ eǆĐhaŶge eaƌnings by 
employing assessment standards that were too restrictive relative to some other major seafarer 
laďouƌ supplǇ ĐouŶtƌies. He ĐoŶĐluded that: ͚MaǇďe ǁe aƌe too stƌiĐt ǁith the eǆaŵiŶatioŶ͛ 
(fieldnote). 
Conclusion 
In summary, the new seafarer supply countries studied in this research varied in the extensiveness of 
their use of computerised assessments, but they all experienced resource pressures on their 
seafarer examination systems which led them to what might be regarded as an over-reliance on 
particular forms of assessment such as multiple choice examinations. The limitations of such forms 
of assessment do not appear to be influencing current decisions about the future forms of 
assessment to be employed in the examination of seafarers, but rather such choices seem to be 
driven strongly by cost and resource considerations. Indeed, the Board of Examiners of one national 
maritime administration met to consider plans for partial computerisation of multiple choice 
assessments during the period of our fieldwork. While industry stakeholders were generally 
supportive of the use of bridge and engine simulators in assessments, they were very critical of the 
use of the multiple choice format assessments which constituted the greater part of the computer-
based assessment systems currently in use. Study of specimen examinations collected during 
fieldwork shows these criticisms to be justified insofar as multiple choice questions did not assess 
ĐaŶdidates͛ higheƌ ĐogŶitiǀe skills of eǀaluatioŶ aŶd sǇŶthesis, aŶd foƌ the most part only tested 
knowledge and comprehension. Other serious problems were also identified in existing 
computerised assessment systems, amongst them the smallness of question banks and the placing 
of question banks in the public domain (which encouraged rote learning and teaching to the test), 
simulator assessments which did not address communication and team-working competencies, and 
various security issues.  
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The dissatisfaction of ship operators with training and assessment standards for licensing and 
certification of officers had led some of them to seek other means to distinguish suitable recruits, 
apart from paper qualifications. Some industry stakeholders only valued candidates trained in 
particular countries or at particular colleges which they regarded as adhering to higher standards. 
Others offered remedial training, and many conducted trials of would-be recruits. Stakeholders were 
ĐƌitiĐal of the effeĐtiǀeŶess of the IMO ͚ǁhite list͛ as a ŵeĐhaŶisŵ foƌ eŶsuƌiŶg that oŶlǇ iŶstitutioŶs 
offering quality training and assessments would receive local accreditation.  
It might be expected that this widespread dissatisfaction with examination standards from the 
demand side of the seafarer labour market would lead to quality improvements from the supply 
side. However, there are ship operators who are not driven by quality, but merely by cost 
considerations, in relation to the recruitment of seafarers and exert little positive pressure on 
administrations and colleges in relation to improvements in standards. There are also labour 
shortages, particularly with regard to senior ranks, and market exigencies which constrain employers 
fƌoŵ ͚ǀotiŶg ǁith theiƌ feet͛ aŶd ƌeĐƌuitiŶg elseǁheƌe ǁheŶ theǇ eŶĐouŶteƌ loǁ staŶdaƌds iŶ 
particular maritime administrations. More importantly, perhaps, national maritime administrations 
recognise that they are engaged in a multi-million dollar business of major significance to their 
national economies with regard to the training, certification, and supply of seafarers, and often are 
more than happy to leave final responsibility for quality controls to employers.  
In progressively moving from the direct control of recruitment and training (through cadetships and 
apprenticeships) to an outsourced global labour market, ship operators have lost control over the 
quality of the labour force. Concerns over the quality of recruits have, in turn, led ship operators to 
call for better regulatory controls over training and certification. However, the responsibility for the 
enforcement of international regulatory standards on training for seafarers lies with the government 
authorities of the new labour supply countries. Even where they maintain a commitment to high 
standards within the seafarer labour market, difficulties in the conduct and control of examinations 
are emblematic of the problems faced by many government authorities. The cross-national picture is 
a variable one, but some countries faced problems in respect of corruption, due to differences in 
what Haines (2003) has called the loĐal ͚ƌegulatoƌǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛, ǁheƌe effeĐtiǀe ƌegulatoƌǇ 
performance is inhibited by local economic, cultural and political influences.  More 
straightforwardly, some countries simply lacked the skilled personnel and economic resources to 
effectively examine the enormous numbers of trainees needed to maintain the million-strong labour 
pool required to crew the international merchant fleet. As Haines (2011) has pointed out, optimal 
vigilance among local regulators requires sufficient resources, high levels of expertise, and political 
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support for regulator autonomy; such necessary pre-conditions are not always to be found in the 
new labour supply countries. To combat corruption and shortages of resources whilst continuing to 
license large numbers of seafarers, some government authorities have chosen to curtail regulatory 
autonomy by the adoption of computer-based assessments, and especially to the use of multiple 
choice formats; other countries have been actively considering a similar move. Ship operators, in 
turn, have voiced their disapproval of such assessments, which do not test higher cognitive skills, 
and cannot be relied upon to sift out seafarers without the desired levels of competence. Thus, 
government authorities in the new labour supply countries find themselves in a double-bind, as they 
seek, in most cases, to supply both high quality and a high quantity of seafarer recruits.  
As previous studies of employment agencies (see McDowell et al. 2008) have shown, outsourcing of 
seafarer labour has led to more segmented markets. Some individual METs try to position 
themselves as suppliers of high quality recruits (in contra-distiŶĐtioŶ to the ͚ǁaƌŵ ďodies͛ supplied 
by their competitors) supplying crews to ͚ďlue ƌiďand͛ Đaƌƌieƌs ĐateƌiŶg foƌ ŶiĐhe-market charterers, 
in contra-distinction to other operators who offer cheaper freight-rates made possible by the lower 
labour costs of their poorer quality seafarer-recruits. We point here to the crucial importance of the 
loss of ship operator control over crew training (despite the existence of an extensive international 
regulatory framework on training) in the emergence of such segmented markets. Arguably, there is a 
tension in all market economies between widening (and cheapening) the labour supply on the one 
hand, and reaping the benefits of productivity that stem from worker expertise and initiative on the 
other. However, this tension is more visible and more acute in respect of an outsourced labour force 
where firms have lost control of worker training. 
 Many ship operators - dissatisfied with the quality of potential recruits - find themselves having to 
expend time and resources to screen suitable recruits because they have lost faith in licenses as 
evidence of training quality. Our study of the impact of offshore outsourcing on training standards in 
a globalised industry shoǁs paƌallels ǁith MaĐKeŶzie͛s ;ϮϬϬϬͿ pƌeǀiouslǇ Ŷoted local case study of 
labour force training at BT plc, where the UK telecommunications company found itself having to re-
intervene in a local labour market from which it had previously withdrawn, accrediting training 
schemes for contractor firms. Likewise, studies of the contracting-out of health and other public 
services in developing countries have shown that successful contracting-out requires the contractor 
to devote substantial additional sums to monitor the execution of the contract. In other words, if 
ship operators wish to continue to transfer the burden of the costs of training and certification to 
developing states it may be that they need to be prepared to contribute to the costs of seafarer 
examinations and MET accreditation/inspection, possibly through a training levy paid when ships are 
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registered with national ship registries, which can then be forwarded to the International Maritime 
Organisation for disbursement. This would address some of the resource problems faced by national 
maritime administrations and might be expected to go some way to improving the rigour of 
assessments for seafarer licenses in some states. It would not, however, address the dilemma faced 
by states in whose interest it is to pump labour out onto the seafarer labour market, recognising it as 
a valuable source of foreign earnings vital to many national economies.  
Issues of the establishment of global standards within education are already of salience with regard 
to the international provision of safety critical services, for example within the medical profession 
(Wojtczak et al. 2000, Schwarz et al. ϮϬϬϳͿ. GiǀeŶ the shippiŶg iŶdustƌǇ͛s status as a tƌaditional 
iŶdustƌǇ tƌaŶsfoƌŵed ďǇ gloďalisiŶg eĐoŶoŵiĐ pƌoĐesses, aŶd giǀeŶ the iŶdustƌǇ͛s eǆteŶsiǀe 
iŶteƌŶatioŶal ƌegulatoƌǇ fƌaŵeǁoƌk oŶ tƌaiŶiŶg staŶdaƌds ;“TCWͿ, theŶ the iŶdustƌǇ͛s pƌoďleŵs ǁith 
assuring a quality global labour force may be of wider interest to observers of other sectors where 
globalisation is less advanced but where safety or quality standards are regarded as high priority. 
The problems of global governance of the shipping industry are not typical, but they may be proto-
typical. Moreover, the shippiŶg iŶdustƌǇ͛s long tradition of international regulation, its respected UN 
agency dedicated to international regulation of the industry, its numerous international conventions, 
and its continuously developing polycentric governance structure, all suggest that the shipping 
iŶdustƌǇ ŵaǇ ďe a ͚ĐƌitiĐal Đase͛ (Goldthorpe et al. 1968) for effective governance: if good 
governance cannot be established in this globalised industry, then the prospects for governance of 
other globalising sectors may be poor.     
In contrast to those many macro studies of globalisation which survey overall patterns of trade and 
flows of investments and people, we have focussed here on the effects of globalising processes 
within a single industry sector (shipping) and a single activity (training), and we have focussed on the 
problems of global governance as they relate to one aspect of that activity, namely the enforcement 
of international training standards through effective assessments of offiĐeƌs͛ competencies in 
licensing examinations. This particular empirical focus has enabled us to contribute to contemporary 
debates (previously described) about the possibilities of effective governance of globalised industry. 
Our case study of the globalised shipping industry argues a general point concerning the complexity 
and challenges associated with the establishment of global standards in relation to education and 
training. Our data confirm previous ǁoƌk oŶ the ƌelatiǀe iŶeffeĐtiǀeŶess of ͚eŶfoƌĐed self-ƌegulatioŶ͛ 
as a governance strategy. Enforced self-regulation can only be effective as a governance strategy if 
non-ĐoŵpliaŶĐe is ultiŵatelǇ puŶishaďle ďǇ a ͚ďig guŶ͛. IŶ the Đase of seafaƌeƌ ĐeƌtifiĐatioŶ, the oŶlǇ 
big gun available to the IMO (deletion of a labour supply country from the IMO white list) could not 
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be deployed: some labour supply countries (like some banks) are too big to fail. Where there is no 
fear of the deployment of a big gun and where there are commercial or other rewards for non-
compliance, then enforced regulation may degenerate into a paper exercise that bears little relation 
to the reality that those papers purport to describe. 
Further, investigation of the global governance of seafarer assessments indicates that differential 
access, cross-nationally, to scarce resources for governance purposes may be a real barrier to overall 
effectiveness. Developing countries with few resources may feel constrained to resort to 
inappropriate computerized assessments for budgetary reasons. Effective global governance may be 
thought to presuppose a fair distribution of governance resources. In 1995 the UN Commission on 
Global Governance concluded that mechanisms to manage the highly integrated global economy 
were lagging behind integration processes. We have shown that, even where there is an extensive 
international regulatory framework constructed by a specialist UN agency (the International 
Maritime Organisation), what Haines (2003) has called ͚loĐal ƌegulatoƌǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌ͛ – local political 
influences, local cultural practices, economic pressures and networks of corruption – serve to 
undermine effective global governance.  Further, the case of the globalised shipping industry also 
argues the enduring importance of nation states in the enforcement of global regulations: local 
political environments and cross-national differences governance resources can be crucial mediating 
factors in shaping local vigilance in enforcement. 
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